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Abstract 
 
This study examines the mechanisms underlying long-run reductions in 
energy consumption caused by a widely studied social nudge. Our 
investigation considers two channels: physical capital in the home and 
habit formation in the household. Using data from 38 natural field 
experiments, we isolate the role of physical capital by comparing 
treatment and control homes after the original household moves, which 
ends treatment. We find 35 to 55 percent of the reductions persist once 
treatment ends and show this is consonant with the physical capital 
channel. Methodologically, our findings have important implications for 
the design and assessment of behavioral interventions. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The textbook approach to dynamic decision making assumes away any direct dependence 
between choices made over time. Instead, past decisions interact with future choices 
through state variables, such as the stock of physical capital (Ramsey, 1928) or natural 
resources (Hotelling, 1931). The tractability of this framework has led to remarkable 
progress in our understanding of dynamics ranging from inflation and unemployment 
(Lucas, 1972) to energy policy and climate change (Nordhaus, 1994). Yet, there are many 
economic settings where the utility an agent experiences may not prove separable from 
one time period to the next. Prime examples include choices motivated by addiction, 
habit, or tradition.   
Dating back to Pollak (1970), researchers have modeled these motivations by 
reimagining state variables as stocks of addiction, habit, or tradition capital. Broadly 
deemed habit formation, this modeling framework has proven invaluable for explaining a 
wide range of behaviors that are outside a parsimonious neoclassical formulation of 
behavior. Examples include consumption of tobacco products (Becker et al., 1994), 
behavior in financial markets (Constantinides, 1990 and Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), 
and the dynamics of economic growth and the business cycle (Carrol et al., 2000 and 
Boldrin et al., 2001).  
But in spite of the explanatory power of habit formation models, it has proven 
remarkably difficult to design programs that successfully induce habitual behavior. For 
example, social programs that targeted habits in the 1960s and 1970s were notoriously 
unsuccessful (see, e.g., Rossi, 1987). More recent work has, by and large, rediscovered 
this fact via field experiments designed to test the theoretical predictions of habitual 
behavior derived in Becker and Murphy (1988). Generally, these studies go as follows. A 
financial incentive is introduced to motivate behavioral change. Under a habit formation 
model, the change in behavior spurred by the incentive will lead to an increase in habitual 
capital for the behavior. The incentive is then removed and the extent to which the 
behavioral change persists is observed.   
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Figure 1 presents a summary of this work by plotting the proportion of the 
incentive effect that persists after the incentive is removed.1,2 Across domains ranging 
from charitable giving (Meier, 2007 and Landry et al., 2010), education (Levitt et al., 
2016), exercise (Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Milkman et al., 2014; Royer et al., 2015; 
and Acland and Levy, 2015), smoking cessation (Volpp et al., 2006 and Volpp et al., 
2009), and weight loss (Volpp et al., 2008), two stark patterns emerge. First, treatment 
effects rarely persist. Only four of the ten studies find behavior consistent with habit 
formation.  Second, when effects do persist, they decay rapidly. Only two of the ten 
studies find more than 25 percent of the initial effect persisting after a month, and only 
one study finds any persistence after six months.  
One remarkable exception to this trend is a program called the Home Energy 
Report (HER), a social nudge that promotes energy conservation through periodic mailers 
comparing a household’s energy use to that of similar neighbors.3 Using data from a 
series of natural field experiments, Allcott and Rogers (2014), AR henceforth, consider 
the lifecycle of the behavioral response to the HER. Perhaps the most provocative finding 
AR report is the persistence of the conservation behavior induced by the HER. As Figure 
1 illustrates, the HER offers an unparalleled dividend years after the program has ended.  
To understand the mechanisms underlying the long-run impacts, AR consider the 
extent to which the HER’s persistence is driven by changes in habit capital or physical 
capital, such as increasing investments in energy efficient technology. To do so, they 
assess the effect of the HER on participation in utility-run energy efficient technology 
programs. They find that the HER induces no appreciable increase in participation in 
these programs, which suggests that the persistence of the HER is driven by changes in 
habits as opposed to changes in capital stock within the home. AR are careful to note, 																																																								
1 Studies were limited to field experiments that observe behavior during and after a financial incentive is 
used to promote behavioral change. If more than one incentive was used then the largest is reported. The 
time dimension reflects the end of the time period of the reported estimate. Nulls are reported if effects are 
not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Studies that utilize commitment devices are excluded, as their 
predictions are outside of a strict habit formation model. See Online Appendix Table 1 for estimates.  
2 There is also a nascent literature on the persistence of interventions that target margins outside of the 
Becker and Murphy (1988) model. We point the interested reader to Rogers and Frey (2015) and the 
citations therein.  
3 The HER is a product offered by the company Opower. Opower is the world leader in software-based 
solutions for utilities. Due to implementation as natural field experiments, HERs have been studied 
extensively, including Allcott (2011; 2015), Ayres et al. (2013), and Costa and Kahn (2013).  
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however, that unobserved adoption of energy efficient technology outside of these 
programs may play a role in their estimates of persistence.  Hence the channels through 
which persistence arises—changes in habits or changes in capital stock—remains an open 
question.     
Yet, if even a small fraction of the persistence were driven by a change in habit 
capital, AR would represent the most compelling existent evidence of a program spurring 
habit formation. From a positive perspective, these results would point to a strong 
complementarity in social norms and the formation of habit capital. Importantly, such 
complementarity would validate the predictions of models that have previously 
considered such (see, e.g., Becker and Murphy, 2000, pp. 18-20, 152-156) and would 
offer a potential explanation for the past failure of programs designed to affect habits 
using only financial incentives. From a normative perspective, these results highlight the 
value of programs that change habits because they provide a long-lived stream of benefits 
at little to no direct or indirect costs, which significantly enhances the cost effectiveness 
and gains to welfare.4  
We complement AR by taking a new approach to identifying the mechanisms 
driving the HER’s persistence. We start by detailing a wrinkle in Opower’s 
administration of the HER that allows us to isolate the role of technology adoption on 
long-run patterns of energy use: upon the sale of a home, Opower ceases all messaging 
for both the incoming and outgoing households but continues to observe energy 
consumption.  
We then develop a multi-period model of household energy consumption and 
capital investment behavior that captures this wrinkle. Our model assumes that receipt of 
the HER changes the shadow price of energy consumption and that investments in 
physical capital are immobile. Through the lens of the model, we learn that distinguishing 
between the household and the home points to an empirical strategy for estimating 
unobserved adoption of energy efficient technology using only observations of energy 
																																																								
4 For example, AR show that accounting for persistence more than doubles the cost effectiveness of the 
HER.  Although AR discuss welfare consequences of the social costs of responding to the HER, it’s unclear 
if there is actually a gap between choices and welfare in the case of Opower, as households are free to opt-
out of the mailer (DellaVigna et al., 2012). For a broader discussion of the welfare effects of the HER see 
Allcott and Kessler (2015).  
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consumption.5 Intuitively, our strategy identifies capital investments induced by the HER 
via a comparison of the HER’s effect before and after the home changes hands, with any 
persistence attributed to capital investments inherited from the initial residents.  
We then link our economic model to an empirical model of energy consumption 
and estimate the model using more than 9 million observations of monthly electricity 
consumption.  These observations come from more than 250,000 homes that see a change 
in ownership over 38 natural field experiments implemented by Opower to test the HER. 
We find that homes that change ownership react to the HER in the same way as the full 
sample of all homes exposed to the HER: they reduce their electricity consumption by 2.4 
percent, on average. Interestingly, approximately 35 to 55 percent of that effect persists in 
the home after the household moves and HER delivery ends.  We further show that this 
estimated persistence in the home is robust to a battery of empirical specifications, data 
inclusion rules, and approaches to incorporating heterogeneity. Additionally, we show 
that our estimates of persistence in the home conform to higher order predictions of our 
theoretical model and we find no evidence to support alternative models of behavior that 
stress the role of sorting.  Taken jointly, we interpret these findings as suggesting that the 
HER serves to induce changes in capital stock and that such changes are important 
drivers of persistence.   
Relating our findings to AR, we test whether our estimates of persistence in the 
home due to physical capital differ from AR’s estimates of persistence in the household 
due to habits and physical capital. We find only weak evidence that our estimates are 
statistically different from the estimates in AR; in fact, for the subsample most similar in 
spirit to AR, initial residents that were exposed to treatment for at least two years, we find 
persistence indistinguishable from AR. We interpret this evidence as supporting an 
important role for physical capital in driving persistence and casting uncertainty over the 
complementarity between social nudges and habit formation. Finally, from a policy 
perspective, we consider the importance of incorporating both direct and indirect costs 
into estimates of cost-effectiveness. We find that previous estimates of the HER’s cost 
																																																								
5 To the best of our knowledge, the only studies to previously consider an identification strategy like this 
are Costa and Kahn (2010) and Bernedo et al. (2014).  
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per kWh saved are more than doubled when the costs of physical capital induced by the 
HER are incorporated. 
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows. In Section II we review the 
administration of the HER by Opower and detail the sample underlying our investigation. 
Section III then considers our theoretical framework, which motivates the empirical 
strategy for identifying unobserved investments in physical capital. Section IV presents 
our empirical results, considers robustness, and assesses alternative explanations. Section 
V discusses the implications of our findings and Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a collection of 38 natural field experiments, henceforth 
waves, implemented by Opower across 21 utilities between 2008 and 2014. Each wave 
utilizes the same experimental design. Households with at least twelve billing months of 
energy service are randomly assigned to a Treatment or Control group.6 Households in 
the Control group are left untouched, while households assigned to the Treatment group 
receive a periodic mailer from Opower called the Home Energy Report (HER).7 Figure 2 
presents an example of the HER, which utilizes a comparison of household and 
neighborhood energy usage, energy conservation tips, and information on energy-
efficient technologies to motivate energy conservation.  
For each wave, we observe four pieces of administrative data via a data sharing 
agreement with Opower. First, we observe monthly electricity consumption in kilowatt 
hours (kWh) for each home. Second, we observe Opower’s assignment of each household 
to the Treatment or Control group. Third, we observe the timing of the intervention in 
each wave, which allows us to partition home-month observations of electricity 
consumption into a Pre-Treatment or Treatment time period. Fourth, we observe the 
timing (if any) of a household’s deactivation of their energy service. Importantly, after 																																																								
6 Opower shared with us a total of 41 waves. We exclude one wave where there are no movers assigned to 
the Control group. We also exclude two waves that fail a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality in the 
distribution of average pre-treatment usage at the five percent level. Online Appendix Tables 2-4 provide 
more details and summary statistics. Excluding waves based on a threshold of ten percent leads to three 
waves being excluded and does not change the results qualitatively.  
7 Across the 38 waves, the HER is received monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly. Previous work suggests that 
frequency does not substantially affect the effectiveness of the intervention (Allcott, 2011) and we adopt 
the approach of AR to pool across different frequencies.  
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deactivation Opower still observed monthly electricity consumption in the home but 
immediately ceased transmission of the HER and excluded the home and household from 
subsequent waves of the HER. We deem the subsample of homes with an account that is 
deactivated movers and further partition time for these homes with a Post-Move time 
period.8 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the full sample, the non-movers 
subsample, and the movers subsample. Comparing across the columns in Table 1, we see 
that slightly more than 10 percent of the homes in the full sample change hands, about 
two-thirds of the homes are assigned to the Treatment group regardless of the subsample, 
and monthly electricity usage is comparable but lower for the movers subsample relative 
to the non-movers subsample. Moving down the summary statistics on the movers 
subsample, we also see the average number of monthly electricity consumption 
observations per home across the Pre-Treatment, the Treatment and Pre-Move, and Post-
Move time periods. In particular, there is an average of about 12 observations per home 
and time period, with more variation in this number of observations in the Treatment and 
Pre-Move and Post-Move time periods relative to the Pre-Treatment time period, which 
reflects the heterogeneity in time of move.   
 
III. Conceptual Framework 
 
To motivate our empirical strategy, we present a model of household energy 
consumption, investment in energy efficient technology, and moral suasion for 
households in our sample. Our goal in presenting this model is to link the parameters 
identified by the reduced form empirical model estimated in Section IV with a richer 
economic model of behavior. This allows us to be precise about the identifying 
assumptions of our empirical model and provides a foundation for assessing alternative 
interpretations of the data.  																																																								
8 Based on discussions with Opower’s staff, we determined that some account deactivations did not 
constitute a move due to one of four reasons: i) accounts become inactive because of changes to the name 
or marital status of the account holder, e.g. marriage or divorce; ii) the deactivation date falls before the 
date of the first HER; iii) the deactivation date falls after the last usage observation for a given home, 
effectively making the household a non-mover account; and iv) the deactivation occurred because the 
household switched energy service providers. We exclude these households from the movers subsample. 
See Online Appendix Table 5 for results that include these households in the movers sample. Results are 
qualitatively unchanged.  
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IIIA: Setup 
 
The setup of our models goes as follows. We imagine a household in time period ! allocating a financial endowment, !, between a numeraire consumption good, !!, and 
inputs for household production of a final consumption good, !!.9 We assume household 
production is described by an increasing and concave function, !(⋅), with energy, !!, and 
a stock of technology, !!, as the inputs. That is, !! = !(!! , !!). Furthermore, we assume 
households purchase energy at a fixed per-unit price, !!, and vary their technology stock 
by investing in new technology, !!, at a fixed per-unit price, !!, with the technology stock 
evolving according to !! = !! + !!!!.10 In the spirit of the findings in Allcott (2011) and 
others we assume that energy consumption behavior partly reflects pro-social 
motivations, with households paying a moral suasion cost, !!, for their consumption of 
energy. We assume this moral suasion cost varies with receipt of the HER via !!, with 
the relationship between messaging and moral suasion costs described by !! = ! !! ,!! , 
where !! is a metapreference parameter in the vein of Becker and Murphy (1993), with !(⋅) increasing in its arguments.11, 12 With this setup established, we next consider the 
optimization problem that households face during the Pre-Treatment, Treatment and Pre-
Move, and Post-Move time periods. 
 
IIIB: Pre-Treatment and Treatment and Pre-Move Time Periods 
 
Consider a household in time period ! ∈ 0, 1  with additively separable 
preferences in utility from the numeraire, !(!!), and household production, !(!!): 
 
 																																																								
9 A specific example of !! relevant to our analysis would be comfortable ambient temperatures.  For a more 
general treatment of household input decisions see Becker (1965), which focuses on time as an input.   
10 !! can be thought of as investments net of depreciation.   
11 We focus on a model with !! increasing in !! for all households. This precludes so-called boomerang 
effects.  This choice is supported by the data, see Allcott (2011), Ferraro and Price (2013), and Ferraro and 
Miranda (2013) for a discussion, but this assumption is not restrictive in the sense that if we observe 
treatment prompting energy increases, our model would still describe how to relate that to technology 
investments.   
12 As has been studied in Herberich et al. (2011) and Allcott and Taubinsky (2015), households could also 
receive utility from green technology purchases.  Our framework ignores this motivation, although 
inclusion would only strengthen the predicted dynamics. 
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max !!,!!,!!   ! !! + ! !! − !!             1                                             !. !.     ! = !! + !!!! + !!!!                                                               !! = ! !!, !!                  !! = !! + !!!!              !! = !(!!,!!)           
 
where !!! given. With utility linear in the numeraire and increasing and concave in !!, 
the solution to (1) is given by the following first-order conditions:  
 2                                       !! !! !! !!, !! = !! + !! !!,!!                                                           !! !! !! !!, !! = !!                                       
 
which tells us that households choose !! and !! to balance the marginal benefits and costs 
of !!. Importantly, the marginal cost of energy includes !! !!,!! , which acts like a 
shadow price on energy consumption. Varying !! is then akin to varying the price of 
energy (perhaps non-linearly) and because households consume !!, not !! or !!, (2) tells 
us they will respond to a price change by varying both inputs, !! and !!.   
The dynamics of energy consumption, pro-social incentives, and technology 
investment become clearer with a flexible parameterization of ! ⋅ ,! ⋅ , and !(⋅). In 
particular, we assume isoelastic utility in !!, ! !! = (!!!!! − 1) (1− !) with ! > 1,13 
a linear moral suasion cost function, ! !! ,!! = !!!!, and a Cobb-Douglas production 
function of !!, !! = !!!!!!!! with ! ∈ (0,1).14 Under this parameterization (2) yields the 
following demand functions for energy and technology investments in period ! ∈ {0,1}: 
 
 
																																																								
13 The law of demand imposes ! > 0 on the typical isoelastic utility function. Following the bulk of 
research on in-home production that uses energy inputs we assume that implied demand for !! is inelastic, 
giving us ! > 1.  See, e.g., Small and Van Dender (2007), Davis (2008), Hughes et al. (2008), and Davis 
and Kilian (2011) for estimates.   
14 The Cobb-Douglas production function is meant to capture an unrestrictive parameterization of the 
household’s production function in the sense that it’s a first-order approximation of a general production 
function.  See Syverson (2011) for a discussion. 
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3                                   !! !! = !1− ! !!!! + !! !!!(!!!)! 1− !!! !!                                          
                             !! !! = !1− ! !!!! + !! !(!!!)!  1− !!! !! − !!!!.                                  
 
The demand functions in (3) demonstrate two important dynamics.  First, there is 
an unambiguous energy demand response from an increase in the moral suasion cost (!!), 
with !!! !! < 0.  Second, investment and moral suasion (!!) are positively related for ! > 1.  That is, if preferences imply inelastic demand for !! then !!! !! > 0.  While this 
first prediction has been extensively tested there is very little evidence on the 
responsiveness of technology investment to changes in moral suasion.  The best estimates 
use data on participation in energy efficiency programs run by electric utilities and find !!! !! ≈ 0 (see AR and citation therein).  However, as electric utility programs often 
focus on a limited subset of all available technologies these estimates could be severely 
attenuated. 
To summarize, Figure 3 plots a time series of energy consumption.  During ! = 0, 
the Pre-Treatment time period, all households consume the same amount of energy, !!(!!).  Then once treatment starts in ! = 1, the Treatment and Pre-Move time period, 
households are randomly assigned to !! ∈ {!!!"#$ ,!!!"!}, where !!!"! > !!!"#$ = !!. Then !!"! = !! !!!"! − !! !!!"#$ < 0  is a reduced form measurement of the effect of 
treatment (i.e., a reduction) on energy use through behavioral and technological 
adjustments.   
 
IIIC: Post-Move Time Period 
 
Now consider the decision problem in the Post-Move time period, ! = 2. We 
assume that new residents inherit the capital and investments of the past homeowner, i.e., !! = !! !! = !! !! + !!, but face a new meta-preference parameter, !!!"#, and treat 
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capital as fixed in the Marshallian sense of the short-run.15,16 This leads to the following 
decision problem in the Post-Move time period: 
 max !!,!!    ! !! + ! !! − !!                   4                                           !. !.     ! = !! + !!!!                                                                              !! = ! !!, !! !!                  !! = ! !!,!!!"# .               
 
Then given the same parameterization as above, solving (4) yields the following energy 
demand function for new residents: 
 
5                          !! !!!"# , !!(!!) = !!!(!!) !!! !!!!! + !!!"# !!!! !!" .                                       
 
This demand function illustrates how technology investments induced by !! in period ! = 1 can persist in the energy consumption decision of a new resident in period ! = 2.  
To see this, first recall that ! = 1 investments are increasing in !!, i.e., !!!/!!! > 0.  
Furthermore (5) shows us that !!!/!!! < 0.  Combining we get !!!/!!! < 0.   
Figure 3 illustrates these predictions in the context of a time series of energy 
consumption choices.  Moving from ! = 1 to ! = 2, a home assigned to the Control 
group does not see their energy consumption change, i.e., !! !!!"#$ = !!(!!!"# , !! !!!"#$ ), but homes assigned to Treatment see an increase, i.e., !! !!!"! < !! !!!"# , !! !!!"!  because all new residents faces the same shadow price on 
energy consumption.  Nonetheless, the Treatment home’s energy consumption remains 
below control because of the inherited technology investments, with !!"#$ = !! !!!"# , !!(!!!"!) − !!(!!!"# , !! !!!"#$ ) < 0  measuring the extent of 																																																								
15 Here we assume !!!"# is orthogonal to !!. This assumption seems justified, as the HER only causes 
about $25 of savings per year in energy costs. Nonetheless, in Section IVD we consider the consequences 
of relaxing this assumption. 
16 While our short-run assumption is a strong one, it only attenuates the effect of the HER in the post-move 
period. 
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treatment persisting through those investments.  Importantly !!"#$ gives us a measure of 
moral suasion’s effect on household technology investment that does not suffer from the 
attenuation bias of earlier estimations because it indirectly observes all investments 
instead of using direct observation of a small subset of possible investments.17   
 
IV. Empirical Results  
 
We start our investigation by considering an event study of the homes in the movers 
sample. Figure 4 plots the difference in average energy consumption between homes 
assigned to Treatment and Control in the Pre-Treatment, Treatment and Pre-Move, and 
Post-Move time periods normalized to the Pre-Treatment time period.18 The figure 
highlights two important results. First, the HER reduces energy consumption in our 
sample of movers. Second, nearly half of the reduction caused by the HER persists in the 
home after the initial household moves.  
The remainder of this section considers the robustness of these findings. We start 
by analyzing the full movers sample in a difference-in-differences framework. This 
allows us to control for characteristics of the time series and cross-section that differ 
across waves and to assess the sensitivity of our results to different definitions of the 
Post-Move time period. We then follow Allcott (2015) and utilize an empirical strategy 
that treats each of the 38 waves as a separate experiment. This framework proves 
valuable both for establishing robustness and assessing predictions derived in Section III. 
Finally, we test alternative interpretations of the results in Figure 4.  
 
IVA. General Results 
Consider a simple empirical model of energy demand:19 
 6        !!"# = !!!! + !!!! + !!"! !!!! + !!!! + !!"#$  !!!! + !! +  !! + !!"#               
 																																																								
17 Utilities also often utilize rebate programs directly at a retailer. In other words, utilities subsidize 
appliances and other technology purchased at a retailer without being able to attribute purchases to a 
particular home. Furthermore, buyers from surrounding municipalities can also take advantage of these 
offers, further complicating attribution to the utility’s customer stock.  
18 See Online Appendix Table 4 for levels of consumption over these event study time periods.  
19 Note that here we have changed the meaning of the time index ! from event time periods to months 
because in (6) the indicator functions act to divide the sample into the three event time periods.   
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where !!"# is energy use in month ! for home ! in experiment wave !, !! is an indicator for 
the home’s treatment status, !!  is an indicator denoting the time period in which 
treatment households receive HERs, !! denotes the post-move event period for each 
home, !! is an indicator for the experimental waves, !! is an indicator for month of 
sample across all waves, and !!"# is a home/wave/month varying unobservable that is 
orthogonal via randomization. The parameters of interest, ! = (!!"! , !!"#$), correspond 
to the quantities described in Section III and summarized in Figure 3 with !!"! measuring 
the effect of treatment on the original resident and !!"#$ capturing the extent to which 
the treatment persists in the home with a new resident.  
To estimate the parameters of interest, !, we run ordinary least squares on (6) and 
conduct inference via standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelations within clustering unit !. Table 2 reports estimates with (6) presented in 
Column 1. We reject the null for !, finding that receipt of HERs reduces energy use with !!"! < 0 (consonant with, e.g., Allcott 2011, 2015). A point estimate of -25 kWh 
represents average reductions of about 2.4 percent relative to the baseline, somewhat in 
the upper range of ATEs in previous work.20 Importantly, we find that a significant 
portion of the treatment effect persists in the home with !!"#$ < 0. Previously treated 
homes use approximately 11 kWh less than control homes after initial occupants have 
moved out. Calculated with the same counterfactual usage as above, this corresponds to 
about a one percent reduction.21  To place these estimates into perspective, !!"!  is 
equivalent to turning off two traditional incandescent lightbulbs for eight hours every day 
or not using a high-end AC window unit (1500W) for 16 hours. !!"#$ is slightly less 
than half of these changes. In terms of technology investments, 11 kWh are the savings 
associated with substituting one incandescent with a CFL lightbulb for a 220 hour 
timespan.22   																																																								
20 Our sample mainly consists of the earlier Opower interventions in Allcott (2015). Consequently, we 
would expect future interventions to lead to smaller reductions because most promising sites were selected 
first. This argument follows through to persistence. 
21 The careful reader will notice a very large (absolute) !!. We treat this potential problem in the following 
subsection.  
22 These numbers are extracted from www.energyusecalculator.com. We want to stress that we do not take 
a stance on whether such reductions are sizable in terms of the environmental impacts – we simply want to 
provide novel evidence of technology adoption. Unfortunately, the nature of average treatment effects and 
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Other columns in Table 2 augment the specification by including additional 
control variables that could affect energy consumption. In Column 2, we use the average 
pre-treatment usage, i.e. !!"  when !! = 0  and !! = 0 , to control for general usage 
patterns of a given property influenced by factors like property size. Column 3 directly 
controls for climate conditions by including monthly cooling and heating degree days 
(CDD, HDD) from the nearest weather station.23 Columns 4 to 6 utilize measures 
describing the local housing market and environmental sentiment of the local population. 
For the former, we add the vacancy rate, i.e. percent of empty housing units, at the ZIP 
level. For the latter, we draw from the League of Conservation Voters’ environmental 
scorecard for congressional representatives (Kahn and Morris, 2009). This index 
aggregates representative’s law making decisions with respect to bills related to the 
environment on a scale from zero to 100.24 Furthermore, we compile publicly available 
data on donations to Green Party committees from 2008 to 2015 (Kahn, 2007; Kahn and 
Vaughn, 2009; Wang and Xu, 2016).25 From these data, we calculate the proportion of 
households in every ZIP code that donated at least once to any Green Party campaign. 
Lastly, Column 7 controls for the full set of additional covariates. Across all 
specifications, we find point estimates and inference to be extraordinarily robust.  
These estimates are also economically meaningful, suggesting that households are 
forward looking in their response to variation in moral suasion, adjusting their marginal 
use of energy as well as their durable technology investments. To see this, consider a 
measure of the proportion of the treatment effect that persists after the original resident 
moves out, ! = !!"#$/!!"!. Estimates of ! from Table 2 range from 0.43 to 0.55 and our 
interpretation of these estimates is that 43 to 55 percent of the treatment effect induced by 
Opower’s HER remain through the physical capital of the home after the original owner 																																																																																																																																																																					
the lack of direct household-level data do not allow us to speak to what types of adoptions were undertaken 
by households in the sample. Furthermore, we cannot identify whether few households adopted a wide 
range of technologies or many households made small changes. However, the effect sizes typically found in 
such RCTs can easily be explained by relatively small changes in the capital stock by the average 
household.  
23 We map the geographic center of a home’s ZIP code to the closest weather station in terms of geometric 
distance. Some weather stations have missing observations of climate variables.  
24 These data are extracted from http://scorecard.lcv.org/. The motives for using these measures are 
explained in more detail in Section VD. 
25 The Federal Election Commission (FEC) publishes individual contributions of at least $200 in every year 
(see http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml). We aggregate these data over time and restrict 
them to donations to any committee affiliated with the Green Party.  
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moved out.26 AR find a similar trend when looking at a different sample of households in 
Opower’s data. In particular, they find that if Opower’s messaging is discontinued, 60 to 
70 percent of the treatment effect persists for households that do not move.27 In relative 
terms, such an effect corresponds to about a two percent reduction in usage after 
treatment cessation in their sample. 
Using utility energy efficiency program participation data, AR attribute this 
persistence to habit formation as opposed to technology investments.  Yet our indirect 
approach to observing technology investments suggests an important role for changes in 
the capital stock of the home. That said, our results do not rule out a role for habit 
formation as we do not observe the behavior of treated households after they move.  
Rather, they complement existing findings and provide first evidence that at least part of 
the story can be explained by rational capital investment. We conduct a more nuanced 
comparison of persistence estimates across the two studies in Section V.  
 
IVB. Robustness to Exclusion of Low-Usage Months 
Estimates in Table 2 also suggest substantial reductions in energy consumption 
across all homes after move (a large absolute post-move indicators, !!). Despite the 
seemingly unrealistic magnitude of the coefficient, this finding can be explained by 
taking into account that some homes remain vacant for extended periods of time before 
being sold.28 Indeed, a look at the raw data reveals that many homes exhibit a dip in 
usage right after move, including multiple months with zero or very low usage. 
Generally, such trends do not pose problems for our identification strategy as long as they 
are constant (or parallel) across treatment and control homes. However, if we worry 
about a correlation between treatment status and the distribution of unoccupied months, 
our estimates can be biased.  																																																								
26 Please note that this is only one way of defining persistence. AR, for example, mainly contrast the 
persistent treatment effect of households no longer receiving HERs to the counterfactual of continued 
receipt of HERs – such a group does not naturally arise in our setting.  
27 AR also estimate a decay parameter to investigate how persistence develops over time. Online Appendix 
Table 6 for results from a similar approach in our setting. In particular, we interact the post-move treatment 
indicators with a measure of time-since-move. Unfortunately, due to the non-experimental nature of our 
data and large variation in time-of-move, our estimates are imprecise and do not allow strong conclusions 
about potential decay.  
28 This is even more important in our time frame, which includes the Great Recession and its housing 
market collapse for many waves.  
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 To mitigate concerns, we test if results are sensitive to different rules of 
eliminating observations where the home was unoccupied. Unfortunately, we only 
observe the date of account deactivation but not a new resident’s account opening date. 
Consequently, we rely on (potentially imperfect) assumptions about what constitutes 
unoccupied homes. Because these measures are crude, we do not directly compare the 
time on the housing market but rather attempt to show robustness across subsamples of 
the data. Online Appendix Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of observations 
with low usage before and after move-out. We find that both treatment and control 
households experience a significant spike in low-usage and zero-usage observations right 
around move. The proportion of these observations declines quickly but continues to be 
relatively pronounced for up to six months after move. Consequently, we provide a range 
of more or less conservative exclusion rules and re-estimate (6) on the restricted samples 
without low-usage observations as defined below. In doing so, we hope to provide 
evidence that our persistence findings are not an artifact of data limitations.  
The four exclusion rules are: i) exclusion of all observations with !!"# < 150 in 
the first six months after deactivation of the account and exclusion of homes for which 
the average energy usage in the post-move period is smaller than the pre-move average 
minus two standard deviations (i.e.  !!"#!! < !!"#!!! − 2!!), ii) exclusion of the first six 
months after account closure regardless of usage, iii) exclusion of all observations after 
account closure that are smaller than the smallest pre-move energy consumption minus 
20 percent (i.e. !!"#!! <  !"# !!"#!!! ∙ 0.8), and finally iv) exclusion of all post-move 
observations with  !!"# < 200. 
Table 3 presents results from these rules and various combinations. Column 1 
depicts the baseline case, which applies (6) to the full sample with no exclusion rule 
applied. A few observations stand out. First, different sample sizes reflect the varying 
degrees of stringency across rules. Second, every rule reduces !! significantly compared 
to the baseline case. In Column 6, for example, the point estimate of !! is no longer 
distinguishable from zero. Other rules reduce !! by between 50 and 85 percent. Third, 
and most importantly, the coefficients of interest are remarkably stable across the 
different samples. We find negative and statistically significant !!"!"  even after 
artificially pushing !!to zero. While some point estimates decrease in magnitude, we 
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still estimate ! to be between 22 and 40 percent. We conclude that results are not driven 
by differential patterns of home occupancy after move.  
 
IVC. Considering Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects 
In Sections IVA and IVB, we estimated an empirical model that assumed 
homogeneous treatment and post-move effects. This made identifying the proportion of 
persistence, !, easy because we could simply take the ratio of !!"#$ and !!"!. However, 
if there is heterogeneity (as Allcott, 2015, clearly shows), this approach could lead to a 
biased estimate of !. In this section we present a two-stage procedure to estimate ! that 
incorporates heterogeneity both in the time series and cross section.  
In the first stage we estimate an augmented version of (6): 
 7          !!"#$ = !!"! !! + !!"!!! + !!"!"! !!!! + !!"!!! + !!"!"#$  !!!! +  !! + !!"#$                    
 
where we allow for heterogeneity in each wave of the experiment, !, and each cohort of 
movers, !, with ! capturing the number of months between reception of the first HER and 
move-out. 29  Conceptually, (7) is just a DD model for each of the wave-cohort 
combinations in the data. We estimate (7) via ordinary least squares for each wave 
separately and conduct the following second stage empirical model with all first stage 
estimates: 
 8                                                         !!"!"#$ = !!!"!"! +!!"                                                                
 
where ! measures the average proportion of the treatment effect that persists in the post-
move period across the waves and cohorts in the data. We estimate ! via weighted least 
squares according to the inverse variance of !!"!"#$/!!"!"!  and conduct inference with 
standard errors clustered within each wave, !. (8) is then akin to a meta-analysis of the 
DD estimates found in (7). 																																																								
29 ! is the number of months that a household assigned to the treatment group would have received 
Opower’s reports. Please note that this is a measure of length of exposure rather than intensity because 
frequency of moral suasion messaging varies across waves and utilities (monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly).  
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Figure 5 plots the parameters of interest from our first-stage regression, (7), in (!!"!"! , !!"!"#$) space.30 To convey the variation in the length of the different cohorts each 
point in Figure 3 is shaded according to the number of years a household was in the 
treatment time period before moving (the median time of treatment exposure is slightly 
over one year). Furthermore, the size of each point reflects the number of homes in a 
wave-cohort with many including well over hundred homes (the median wave-cohort is 
330). Figure 5 also illustrates how (8) estimates ! by plotting the best-fit line. Table 4 
presents that estimate in Column 1.  The estimate of  !!"#$ suggests that about 35 percent 
of the treatment effect persists in the post-move period, rejecting !  of zero at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.31  
Table 4 also considers the relationship between persistence and the timing of the 
moving decision. If a household assigned to treatment enters the treatment period with 
plans to move soon, they are more likely to behave like a short-run household that holds 
technology fixed.32 By a simple envelope argument our model in Section IIIB predicts !!"!"#$/!!"!"! to be increasing in the magnitude of !. That is, households that received 
HERs for a short period of time should see smaller (in magnitude) per-month energy 
usage reductions from treatment than households that received HERs for longer periods 
of time. Furthermore, homes exposed to only few HERs should see a smaller proportion 
of the treatment effect persisting after the original resident moves relative to households 
receiving treatment for an extended period.   
We test this prediction in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 by estimating 
 9       !!"!"#$ = !!!!"#!"#$ !!"!"!1 !ℎ!"# + !!"#$!"#$!!"!"!1 !"#$ +!!" ,  
 
where 1(∙) denotes the indicator function for households exposed to treatment for a short 
or long period of time, respectively. We define the cut-off in two ways: i) one year, the 																																																								
30 For cosmetic reasons we limit the figure to !!"!"#$ < 250 and !!"!"! < 150.  
31 See Online Appendix Table 7 for estimates that consider robustness over the different exclusion rules 
discussed above. 
32 Some have suggested that households may make investments right before moving to increase the value of 
their home.  When we look at the energy efficiency program participation data used in AR one can see a 
steep decline in participation starting 19 months before a resident moves. This evidence is available upon 
request from the authors.    
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mean length of exposure in our data, in Column 2 and ii) two years of HER exposure, 
mirroring the time frame in AR, in Column 3. We estimate this model without a constant 
and statistically test the difference between !!!!"#!"#$  and !!"#$!"#$ . Across the two 
specifications we find that !!"!"#$/!!"!"!  is indeed increasing in the length of exposure.33 
In fact, persistence in homes with initial residents who were exposed to HERs for a 
substantial time is approximately twice the persistence in short-term properties. These 
differences between the short-run and the long-run effect are significant at high levels of 
confidence and coefficients are precisely estimated.  
 
IVD. Alternative Interpretations  
In Section III we assumed that new residents do not sort into homes based on 
investment differences caused by treatment. To assess the validity of this assumption, we 
sketch out a partial equilibrium sorting model in the post-move time period (! = 2), 
derive predictions, and then test those predictions using proxy variables of housing 
market conditions. Across all proxies we reject the predictions of the sorting model.   
Consider an agent looking to purchase a home in housing market ℎ at the start of 
event time period ! = 2. We assume the agent faces a market where there is a continuum 
of identical homes that vary only according to their technology stock, which we represent 
with !! just as we did in previous sections. The price of a home in market ℎ varies 
according to the extent of its technology stock, !!,! !! , with price increasing in !!. We 
also assume the agent solves a two-period decision problem. In the first time period 
(! = 2) the technology stock of the home they purchase is fixed but in the second period 
(! = 3) they can make investments to vary their new home’s technology stock.  The 
maximization problem is: 
 
 
 
 																																																								
33 We also estimate a simple model with a linear time trend in cohort, i.e. length of exposure to treatment. 
We find that persistence significantly increases in length of exposure (at the five percent level). Online 
Appendix Table 8 reports results.  
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    max !! , !! ,!!,!! ! !! + ! !! − ! !!,!!"# + !" !! + !" !! − !" !!,!!"#    10          !. !.      ! + !!!! = !! + !!!! + !!,! !! +  !!!!!!!  + !!!!! + !!!!!!!                                                    !! = ! !!, !!                                                                                  !! = ! !!, !! + !!                                                         
 
where ! is the agent’s discount rate, ! is the interest rate they face, and !!"#  is the 
agent’s exogenous pro-social meta-preference parameter that is constant over the relevant 
decision period.  Imposing the same assumptions from Section III on (10) and assuming 
linearity in the price of existing technology we see the following by combining first-order 
conditions: 
 11                                                     !!!! = !!!!,! − !!  .                                                                        
 
(11) tells us that the agent solving (10) will choose existing technology versus new 
technology according to their relative prices.  Put differently, (11) shows that agents will 
sort into houses with more existing capital when the price of capital is low relative to the 
price of investments.  If the price of investing is stable across housing markets, then we 
have a simple way of testing (10): Compare !!"#$ in housing markets with high !!,! to 
the same parameter in markets with low !!,!, with the sorting model predicting !!"#$ is 
decreasing in !!,! and the model in Section III predicting a null effect to changes in !!,!.   
While we do not directly observe !!,! we assume that it varies with housing 
market conditions. Firstly, we consider a scenario where demand for !! is fixed and 
supply-side conditions vary according to the housing vacancy rate in each zip code (our 
proxy for ℎ) with demand fixed.  If high vacancy levels correspond to supply shifts of !! 
then !!,! will be decreasing in the extent of housing vacancies.34 Secondly, we consider a 
scenario where supply of !! is fixed and demand-side conditions vary according to the 
environmental sentiments in a housing market.  																																																								
34 Alternatively, vacancies could weaken the bargaining power of the home seller causing the buyer to pass 
more of the cost of !!, !!,!, onto the seller when vacancy levels are high.   
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We proxy for environmental sentiments by linking a home to their Congressman’s 
National Environmental Scorecard rating which is published annually by the League of 
Conservation Voter. Additionally, we utilize the Federal Election Commission’s 
individual contributions data to compile a county and district measure of giving to any 
Green Party committee between 2008 and 2015. These data include all individual 
donations of at least $200 and we calculate the proportion of households in a given ZIP or 
county who gave at least once during our sample period. If high environmental sentiment 
markets correspond to demand shifts for !! then !!,! will be increasing in these proxies. 
Table 5 presents estimates of our coefficients of interest from (6) and their 
interaction with proxies of supply and demand conditions. The results in Row 1 indicate 
that !!"#$  is increasing in vacancy rates, one of our proxies for !!,!. An increase in the 
vacancy rate of one percentage point is associated with a reduction in persistence of about 
one kWh.  This rejects the sorting model, which predicts the opposite relationship. Rows 
2 to 5 of Table 5 present specifications where the coefficients of interest are interacted 
with our four definitions of environmental sentiments. Across all specifications, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no additional impact of green sentiment. Again, this 
does not match the predictions of the sorting model.35  
The evidence presented in this section indicates that sorting consonant with a 
simple price-based model is not supported by the data. While this does not formally rule 
out sorting, three additional factors speak against an important impact of sorting. Firstly, 
homes with extensive capital investments plausibly attract residents with high baseline 
use because large savings can be realized. If such people were sorting into treatment 
homes, !!"#$ is likely to be a lower bound on persistence. Secondly, more efficient 
technology can lead to a rebound effect because household production of energy-related 
goods becomes cheaper. Again, such an effect would strengthen our results. Thirdly, for 
sorting to be an issue, there has to be technology adoption in the first place. Otherwise, 
no signal of efficient capital could be observed by home buyers. In other words, if sorting 
of a form not captured by our proxies is a common occurrence, it can only be due to prior 
capital investment by initial residents. The only difference then lies in interpretation: the 																																																								
35 Table 5 is based on DD specifications with interaction terms. The full regression tables are provided in 
Online Appendix Table 9. 
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persistent effect estimated by us would capture a combination of technology and 
crowding in of green residents. Together, these observations suggest that our estimates 
pick up direct effects of technology investment. 
 
V. Implications 
 
In this section, we relate our estimates of persistence due to capital investment to the 
estimates of persistence in AR. While our study and AR both assess the long-run effects 
of the HER, the samples have no overlap, making a direct comparison of behavior 
impossible. Instead, we conduct the following exercise. First, we obtain the preferred 
estimates of persistence in AR across each of their three sites.36 Second, we test the 
hypothesis that our estimates of persistence, which we attribute to capital investments in 
the home, are equal to the estimates of persistence in AR, which are attributed to a 
combination of investments in the home and habits. In doing so, we hope to formally 
assess the extent to which accumulation of habit capital is responsible for the estimates of 
persistence in AR.  
Panel A of Table 6 presents results. In Column 1, we see that the persistence from 
technology observed over our entire sample is significantly lower than the persistence 
estimated across the three sites in AR. However, when we focus on just the subsample of 
homes in our sample that are most comparable to AR—households in AR receive the 
HER for two years—in Columns 2 and 3, we see that estimates across the two studies 
become quite similar. While future work is clearly needed to decompose the mechanisms 
that lead to long-run effects in response to the HER, our estimates suggest that a 
significant portion (or nearly all) of the persistence observed in AR is due to unobserved 
investments in energy efficient technology rather than habit formation.  
This finding also has important implications for the normative assessment of the 
HER. Economists have long emphasized the importance of incorporating both direct and 
indirect costs when assessing program performance (see, e.g., Heckman and Smith, 																																																								
36 In particular, we use point estimates from Table 4 of Allcott and Rogers (2014, pp. 3024) that compare 
the proportion of the HER effect that persists for households that have the HER discontinued versus 
households that do not have the HER discontinued. We choose these estimates because they correspond 
most closely to the discussion of persistence in AR, “The point estimates…suggest that continuing the 
intervention increases the treatment effects in the post-drop period by a remarkable 50 to 60 percent” 
(Allcott and Rogers, 2014, pp. 3024). Please note that the data used by AR are not part of our sample. 
	 23 
1998). If the HER induces adoption of costly capital, earlier estimates of its cost-
effectiveness may be unduly optimistic due to the omission of these adoption costs. To 
estimate the extent to which cost-effectiveness is influenced by the costly capital 
investment, we revisit earlier estimates of the HER’s cost-effectiveness in light of our 
findings.  
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of this exercise for the treatment and pre-
move period. Consistent with AR, we start by assuming the direct cost of administering 
the HER to one household is $1 per report. Following the standard approach in the 
literature, we simply compare this direct cost to savings achieved by the HER as 
estimated in Column 1 of Table 2 (-24.98 kWh) (No Technology). To also account for the 
indirect costs of the HER, we use a lower-bound estimate of the cost of capital per kWh 
of electricity saved in Allcott and Greenstone (2012, pp. 17).37 With this cost estimate, 
we convert savings achieved by capital investment—as a proportion of total savings 
using our estimates of persistence in the first row—into dollars. 38  Applying this 
conversion, we see that the HER induces an indirect cost that ranges from $0.74 to $1.15 
per report and household. The resulting cost-effectiveness is reported in the last row for 
all three subsamples (Technology).  
Comparing the two approaches to estimating cost-effectiveness in Panel B of 
Table 6, we see that incorporating the indirect cost of investments in capital more than 
doubles the cost per kWh in two out of three cases. From this perspective, after 
accounting for direct and indirect costs of technology adoption, alternative programs to 
																																																								
37 Allcott and Greenstone (2012) estimate a cost of energy efficient technology per kWh saved of 8.5¢. 
They reach this conclusion by reviewing the literature on demand-side management programs, which uses 
subsidies and other economic incentives to encourage uptake of energy-efficient technology. Assuming a 
discount rate of 5 percent and installation and purchase costs of 70 percent, they conclude that the cost of 
energy efficient technology per kWh is about 8.5¢. An alternative approach would use the marginal cost of 
a kWh of electricity as an upper bound on the cost of technology. The national average for residential users 
since 2010 is about 12¢. Consequently, using this strategy would only strengthen our point. 
38 Allcott and Greenstone (2012) provide a detailed discussion of other indirect costs, e.g. households could 
experience utility losses due to a less comfortable ambient temperature, warm glow from contributing to a 
public good, etc. Consonant with previous work on cost-effectiveness of Opower’s programs, we ignore 
these costs and benefits. Furthermore, we do not include estimates of discounted long-term benefits 
exceeding the sample period or capital depreciation over time. Allcott and Kessler (2015) find supporting 
evidence for effects driven by moral utility. 
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the HER discussed in Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) and Allcott and Greenstone (2012) 
appear much more attractive.39    
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Policies motivated by behavioral insights have increased in popularity across many 
different environments, based in part on experimental evidence of their effectiveness. 
Yet, relatively little is understood about the underlying mechanisms – the how and why of 
the average treatment effects observed.  In particular, we know little about whether such 
policies change habits in ways that persist when the behavioral intervention ends. Our 
lack of understanding is caused by a lack of rigorous theories of nudges (an area that is 
improving quickly) and by missing household-level data that would permit the analyst to 
draw conclusions about actual steps taken by the people who are nudged. Importantly, 
depending on the underlying mechanisms, conclusions about short- and long-term costs 
and benefits can change significantly.  
This paper develops a simple short- and long-run theoretical model of household 
production in the Beckerian tradition. In our model, households produce consumption 
good in their home using energy and capital that varies in its energy efficiency. Moral 
suasion from an intervention like Opower’s standard Home Energy Reports is 
represented by a shadow price on energy use.  Moral suasion thus induces relative price 
changes that lead rational agents to adjust their behavior – a phenomenon widely 
documented in the literature – and to invest in energy efficient capital. We then utilize 
data from 38 natural field experiments and employ a novel identification strategy to show 
that a significant proportion of the initial treatment effect persists after treated households 
move out of their homes. This effect is robust across different specifications and 
alternative models of behavior that emphasize sorting are rejected by the data.  
Although we do not invalidate or rule out behavioral adjustments, our findings 
suggest a previously understated role of capital investments in response to social nudges. 
This channel is widely missing from existing calculations of cost-effectiveness and cost-																																																								
39 Interestingly, Allcott and Kessler (2015) find that household willingness to pay for continued receipt of 
the HER is less than estimates of the HER’s cost-effectiveness that assumes no investments in physical 
technology. The authors attribute this gap to moral utility. Clearly more work is needed to parse the costs of 
motivating conservation via moral utility from the costs of energy efficient technology upgrades. 
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benefit analyses. As such, our findings have clear policy relevance and highlight the 
importance of theory and creative empirical strategies to identify parameters of interest. 
Unfortunately, current technology and data availability do not allow us to speak to the 
open question of what types of technologies are adopted. With the ascent of smart 
technology solutions and better ways to monitor energy usage, we are optimistic that 
future work will be able to provide answers. 
Earlier research on habit formation presents a pessimistic perspective on the 
ability of policies and programs to induce persistent changes in habits.  Our study does 
little to overturn this view.  Despite our findings, we believe that there is still much that 
we do not understand about habit formation and ways to induce changes in such.  Recent 
research suggests that one particularly promising dimension is to focus investments on 
programs that target habitual behavior at early ages (see, e.g., Almlund et al., 2011).  We 
would encourage future work to explore such programs and whether habits are easier to 
form at a young age. 
Finally, in the context of energy policy goals, our research does point to a 
promising alternative to habit formation, such as the dissemination of energy efficient 
technologies (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012).  Our research suggests that while social 
nudges may have little impact on the formation of new habits, they do appear to provide 
an effective way to induce the adoption of technologies that obviate the need for changes 
in habits. We imagine a useful exercise for future work is to leverage the identification 
strategy developed in this study to parse the role of habits induced by different policy 
changes from changes in other state variables, such as physical capital.   
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Notes: Each point represents the proportion of the initial treatment e ect that persists
for a given amount of time since the end of a given intervention. All observations are
based on point estimates presented in the corresponding studies with insignificance at
the five percent level constituting persistence of zero.
Figure 2: Opower’s Home Energy Report
(a) Front (b) Back
Notes: The figure presents the front and back of a typical Home Energy Report (HER).
Treatment households receive reports regularly (monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly) be-
fore move-out. The example depicts a household below the 20th percentile of usage in a
given month.
Figure 3: Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Model
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Figure 4: Event Study
-10
-5
0
Pre-Treatment Treatment & Pre-Move Post-Move
Time Period
No
rm
ali
ze
d
Di
 e
re
nc
e
of
El
ec
tri
cit
y
Co
ns
um
pt
ion
in
Tr
ea
tm
en
ta
nd
Co
nt
ro
lH
om
es
in
kW
h
Notes: Figure plots the di erence between average electricity consumption homes as-
signed to Treatment and Control in the Pre-Treatment, Treatment and Pre-Move, and
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Online Appendix Table 4 for levels.
Figure 5: Scatterplot of Treatment E ect by Wave-Cohort
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Notes: The figure plots the e ect of the HER for each wave-cohort in the Post-Move time period as a function of the e ect of the
HER in the Treatment and Pre-Move time period; i.e., the parameters of interest from our first stage regression in (7), ”ˆtrtjc and
”ˆmovejc . The top panel plots wave-cohorts that receive the HER in the Treatment and Pre-Move time period for less than 1 year
and the bottom panel plots wave-cohorts that receive the HER in the Treatment and Pre-Move time period for more than 1 year.
The size of each point reflects the number of unique homes in that wave-cohort. The best-fit line illustrates how (8) estimates
“prst, “prst
short
, and “prst
long
. The figure excludes wave-cohorts with |”movejc | > 250 and |”trtjc | > 150 in the figure but the best-fit
lines are from regression estimates on the full-sample.
Table 1: Overview of Sample
Sample
Full Non-Movers Movers
Utilities 21 21 21
Waves 38 38 38
Households 2,516,089 2,258,185 253,383
Treatment Indicator 0.67 0.67 0.65
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
Pre-Treatment Usage (kWh) 1,198.82 1,212.08 1,084.51
(652) (655.44) (609.48)
Pre-Treatment Observations (mos.) 13.47
(1.26)
Treatment and Pre-Move Observation (mos.) 11.67
(9.62)
Post-Move Observation (mos.) 12.17
(9.44)
Notes: Summary statistics for the full sample, the subsample of households that remain
in the same home throughout (Non-Movers), and houses that change hands (Movers).
Treatment Indicator is a binary measure of assignment to reception of Home Energy
Reports (HERs). Pre-Treatment Usage describes the average monthly usage in kWh in
months prior to the first HER. Pre-Treatment Observations show the number of usage
reads before the treatment event period begins (i.e. the first full month after the first
HER), Treatment and Pre-Move Observations represents the length of exposure to HERs,
and Post-Move Observations occur after initial residents deactivate their account. The
small disparity between the di erence of the full sample and the non-movers sample and
the number of unique households in the final movers sample is due to additional data
cleaning as described in-text.
Table 2: Estimates of Treatment E ect: Pooled Di erence-in-Di erence Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
—ˆT 6.50 7.01 8.34 6.35 6.70 6.50 7.01
(2.05) (0.48) (2.37) (2.05) (2.09) (2.05) (0.62)
—ˆH -53.71 -58.45 -54.36 -53.83 -54.16 -53.72 -57.93
(1.72) (1.45) (2.04) (1.73) (1.77) (1.72) (1.73)
”ˆtrt -24.98 -22.69 -25.63 -24.93 -24.48 -24.97 -22.64
(2.05) (1.50) (2.45) (2.06) (2.10) (2.05) (1.84)
—ˆM -148.30 -131.10 -154.40 -149.14 -149.13 -148.30 -136.24
(2.73) (2.51) (3.24) (2.74) (2.79) (2.73) (3.03)
”ˆmove -11.35 -12.73 -11.18 -11.25 -11.41 -11.35 -13.14
(2.64) (2.57) (3.13) (2.65) (2.69) (2.64) (3.09)
Pre-Exp. Usage 0.80 0.80
(0.00) (0.00)
CDD 0.88 0.89
(0.01) (0.01)
HDD 0.14 0.15
(0.00) (0.00)
Vacancy Rate -1.07 -1.08
(0.16) (0.11)
Env. Index -0.28 0.05
(0.03) (0.02)
Green Party Donations -0.05 0.21
(0.03) (0.09)
R2 0.216 0.444 0.232 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.453
N 9,350,745 9,350,725 6,127,816 9,247,833 8,921,649 9,350,642 5,821,922
Notes: Dependent variable is monthly energy usage (kWh). The unit of observation is household-month. All models
include wave-of-treatment (RCT) and month-of-sample fixed e ects. Coe cients superscripted by T, M, and H denote the
Pre-Treatment, Treatment and Pre-Move, and Post-Move time period, respectively. Additional controls include (2) pre-
experiment average monthly usage, (3) cooling and heating degree days (CDD and HDD), (4) vacancy rate in percent at
the ZIP level, (5) environmental concern index (lifetime) of congressional representatives at the ZIP level (0-100), (6) the
percentage of households giving at least $200 to any Green Party committee from 2008 to 2015 on the county level, and (7)
a combination of (2)-(6). Sample sizes di er because we do not observe all covariates for every ZIP code (county). Robust
standard errors are clustered at the property level for all specifications.
Table 3: Estimates of Treatment E ect: Robustness of Pooled Di erence-in-Di erence Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
—ˆT 6.50 6.45 5.31 6.01 5.52 5.83 5.48 6.25
(2.05) (2.13) (2.05) (2.13) (2.05) (2.13) (2.05) (2.13)
—ˆH -53.71 -45.70 -36.96 -44.45 -38.98 -41.32 -39.26 -45.70
(1.72) (1.79) (1.74) (1.83) (1.71) (1.78) (1.71) (1.79)
”ˆtrt -24.98 -25.71 -25.69 -25.49 -27.71 -27.36 -26.57 -26.37
(2.05) (2.18) (2.05) (2.18) (2.05) (2.18) (2.05) (2.18)
—ˆM -148.30 -56.93 -81.38 -48.06 -38.59 -0.67 -44.72 -22.02
(2.73) (2.82) (3.46) (3.59) (2.78) (2.86) (2.75) (2.84)
”ˆmove -11.35 -10.40 -8.20 -10.23 -6.20 -7.01 -7.64 -9.03
(2.64) (2.67) (3.32) (3.38) (2.64) (2.67) (2.65) (2.68)
Rule(s) 1 2 1 & 2 3 1 & 3 4 1 & 4
R2 0.216 0.218 0.227 0.228 0.225 0.225 0.217 0.219
N 9,350,745 8,455,824 8,020,384 7,339,044 8,963,045 8,257,039 9,019,435 8,317,631
Notes: Dependent variable is monthly energy usage (kWh). The unit of observation is household-month. All models include
wave-of-treatment (RCT) and month-of-sample fixed e ects. Coe cients superscripted by T, M, and H denote the Pre-
Treatment, Treatment and Pre-move, and Post-Move time period, respectively. Column (1) is the baseline model utilizing
the full sample. Exclusion Rules: Rule 1 excludes observations with eijt < 150 in any or all of the first six months after
move and homes for which e¯ijt=move < (e¯ijt=pre≠move ≠ 2 · SD(eijt=pre≠move)). Rule 2 excludes the first six months after
move regardless of use. Rule 3 disregards post-move observations that are below the smallest pre-move observation minus
20 percent (i.e. min eijt=pre≠move · 0.8). Rule 4 excludes all post-move observations with eijt < 200, regardless of when they
occur. No additional controls are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the property level for all specifications.
Table 4: Estimates of Persistence: Meta-Analysis of Wave-Cohort Di erence-in-
Di erence Model
(1) (2) (3)
“ˆprsttotal 0.3468
(0.0495)
“ˆprst<1Y r 0.2632
(0.0640)
“ˆprstØ1Y r 0.5295
(0.0614)
“ˆprst<2Y r 0.3300
(0.0513)
“ˆprstØ2Y r 0.5449
(0.0693)
Null Hypothesis (H0)
“ˆprst<t = “ˆprstØt , p-value <0.01 0.02
R2 0.000 0.162 0.147
N 654 654 654
Notes: Coe cients in the table represent the average proportion of initial treatment
e ects (i.e., during the Treatment and Pre-Move time period) that persist in the Post-
Move period, “. For example, a coe cient of 0.3 means that 30% of the initial treatment
persist after move. The first column presents an estimate of “prst based on (8) for the full
sample. Robust standard errors are clustered at the wave level for all specifications. We
excludes wave-cohorts with less than 10 unique households. We estimate “ via weighted
least squares according to the inverse variance of ”ˆmovejc /”ˆtrtjc . Columns 2 and 3 present
estimates of “prst for two strata: movers who are exposed to one year (two years) of
treatment or less and those who are exposed to more than one year (two years) for
Columns 2 and 3, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the wave level
for all specifications.
Table 5: Testing Predictions of a Sorting Model
Sorting Estimates
Sort Variable (0-100) Prediction ”ˆtrt ”ˆtrt · Sort ”ˆmove ”ˆmove · Sort
Vacancy Rate [≠] -27.86 0.39 -21.50 1.16(3.46) (0.33) (4.78) (0.47)
Environmental Index (Annual) [+] -34.51 0.20 -11.68 0.03(3.97) (0.07) (4.69) (0.08)
Environmental Index (Lifetime) [+] -35.63 0.23 -13.21 0.07(3.94) (0.07) (4.83) (0.08)
Green Party Donations (District) [+] -33.36 3.86 -16.51 2.32(4.89) (2.05) (6.21) (2.59)
Green Party Donations (County) [+] -25.68 0.16 -11.88 0.13(2.08) (0.08) (2.68) (0.10)
Notes: Brackets indicate the sign on the interaction coe cient (”ˆmove · Sort) predicted
by the sorting model. Dependent variable is monthly energy usage (kWh). The unit of
observation is household-month. We utilize the following measures as proxies of home
vacancies and environmental sentiment: i) vacancy rate in percent at the ZIP level, ii)
annual environmental concern index of congressional representatives for each district,
iii) lifetime index of representatives, iv) percentage of households giving at least $200
to any Green Party committee from 2008 to 2015 on the congressional district level,
and v) giving to Green Party on the ZIP code level. See Online Appendix Table A4 for
all model estimates. Robust standard errors are clustered at the property level for all
specifications and we report coe cients using wave and month-of-sample fixed e ects.
Table 6: Implications of Findings
“ˆprsttot “ˆ
prst
Ø1Y r “ˆ
prst
Ø2Y r
Panel A: Comparison of Persistence Estimates to AR
Estimate 0.347 0.529 0.545
Standard Error 0.049 0.061 0.069
Null Hypothesis (H0)
“ˆprsti = 0.635 [Site 1], p-value 0.000 0.093 0.200
“ˆprsti = 0.671 [Site 2], p-value 0.000 0.027 0.077
“ˆprsti = 0.623 [Site 3], p-value 0.000 0.138 0.270
Panel B: Cost-E ectiveness in Treatment and Pre-Move Period
Direct Program Costs ($/household-month) 1 1 1
Indirect Program Costs ($/household-month) 0.74 1.12 1.16
Savings (kWh/household-month) 24.98 24.98 24.98
Cost-E ectiveness (¢/kWh)
No Technology 4.00 4.00 4.00
Technology 6.95 8.50 8.64
Notes: Panel A provides a direct comparison of our estimates of persistence due to
capital investment and persistence in AR due to technology and habit formation. We
relate our estimates from Table 4 to all three sites in AR (Table 7, p. 3031). In par-
ticular, persistence in AR is defined as the proportion of the treatment e ect of the
dropped group in the post-drop period relative to the treatment e ect of the continued
group in the same time period. The comparison is based on a simple one-sample T -Test
and table entries represent the corresponding p-values. Panel B reproduces a typical
cost-e ectiveness calculation for two cases in the treatment and pre-move period: (No
Technology) assumes that reductions are solely caused by behavioral adjustments; (Tech-
nology) instead considers that a proportion of the overall treatment e ect may be due
to capital investment, based on our estimates of persistence. The di erence between the
two scenarios is the inclusion of indirect costs associated with capital investment. We
follow Allcott and Greenstone (2012) and use their preferred estimate of 8.5¢ per kWh
saved due to capital investment (p. 17). For both cases, we assume a cost of $1 per
report and use the preferred estimate from Table 4 to determine monthly savings (-24.98
kWh).
Online Appendix Figure 1: Time Series of Low-Usage Observations
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Notes: We plot the proportion of low-usage observations—defined as usage within the
first percentile—and zero-usage observations for treatment and control households. Time
t = ≠1 depicts the last full month before move, t = 0 the month in which the move
occurs, t = 1 the first full month after move, and so on.
Online Appendix Table 1: Persistence in Studies of Habit Formation
Significance
Weeks Since Level of
End of Reported Reported Citation for
Study Topic Intervention E ect E ect Reported E ect Persistence
Charness & Gneezy 2009 Exercise 0 1.32 0.01 Online Appendix & Authors’ Calc. 1
Charness & Gneezy 2009 Exercise 5 0.88 0.01 Online Appendix & Authors’ Calc. 0.67
Charness & Gneezy 2009 Exercise 8 0.67 0.05 Online Appendix & Authors’ Calc. 0.51
Milkman, Minson, & Volpp 2014 Exercise 0 0.48 0.01 Table 3, Col. 2 1
Milkman, Minson, & Volpp 2014 Exercise 9 0.03 >0.05 Table 3, Col. 2 & Authors’ Calc. 0
Acland & Levy 2015 Exercise 0 1.449 0.01 Table 1, Col. 1 1
Acland & Levy 2015 Exercise 8 0.188 0.05 Table 1, Col. 1 0.13
Acland & Levy 2015 Exercise 27 0.096 >0.05 Table 1, Col. 1 0
Royer, Stehr, & Syndor 2015 Exercise 0 0.56 0.01 Table 2, Col. 2 1
Royer, Stehr, & Syndor 2015 Exercise 9 0.12 0.05 Table 2, Col. 2 0.21
Royer, Stehr, & Syndor 2015 Exercise 22 0.11 0.05 Table 2, Col. 2 0.20
Royer, Stehr, & Syndor 2015 Exercise 48 0.12 0.05 Table 3, Col. 2 0.21
Royer, Stehr, & Syndor 2015 Exercise 100 0.12 >0.05 Table 3, Col. 2 0
Volpp et al. 2008 Weight Loss 0 9.2 0.05 Table 2 & Authors’ Calc. 1
Volpp et al. 2008 Weight Loss 13 7.4 >0.05 Figure 2 & Corresponding Text 0
Levitt, List, & Sado  2010 Education 0 0.083 0.05 Table 7, Col. 1 1
Levitt, List, & Sado  2010 Education 52 0.063 >0.05 Table 7, Col. 1 0
Levitt, List, & Sado  2010 Education 104 -0.003 >0.05 Table 7, Col. 1 0
Levitt, List, & Sado  2010 Education 156 0.017 >0.05 Table 7, Col. 1 0
Volpp et al. 2009 Smoking 0 9.7 0.01 Table 2 1
Volpp et al. 2009 Smoking 26 5.8 0.01 Table 2 0.60
Volpp et al. 2006 Smoking 0 11.7 0.01 Abstract 1
Volpp et al. 2006 Smoking 13 1.9 >0.05 Abstract 0
Online Appendix Table 2: Overview of Utilities in the Sample
All Households Movers
Utility Location Unique Homes Observations Unique Homes Observations Percentage
1 Midwest 346,480 14,450,660 72,384 3,013,774 20.89
2 Midwest 320,414 11,024,640 40,247 1,394,702 12.56
3 West 34,693 1,226,796 8,239 286,772 23.75
4 Midwest 482,902 16,291,960 44,694 1,625,511 9.26
5 Midwest 182,083 4,890,361 19,698 529,661 10.82
6 Midwest 76,721 2,175,558 2,837 83,622 3.70
7 West 119,025 4,479,500 13,046 484,373 10.96
8 Northeast 182,875 3,975,601 5,536 113,633 3.03
9 Northeast 50,374 1,092,431 3,948 81,246 7.84
10 Northeast 128,243 2,791,966 1,406 29,112 1.10
11 South 62,566 1,898,726 66 1,495 0.11
12 West 96,980 2,651,808 9,329 267,076 9.62
13 West 24,708 908,969 5,049 184,099 20.43
14 Midwest 73,918 2,122,780 6,309 177,671 8.54
15 Northeast 109,207 2,618,094 6,427 149,159 5.89
16 Midwest 40,680 1,252,132 6,123 193,201 15.05
17 South 96,434 2,731,790 6,754 208,618 7.00
18 West 26,773 556,650 1,091 22,362 4.08
19 West 83,896 5,527,008 18,319 1,206,545 21.84
20 West 39,918 680,969 12 141 0.03
21 West 122,580 2,546,808 3,783 77,302 3.09
22 Midwest 106,308 4,566,773 14,398 632,713 13.54
Notes: The table presents an overview of all utilities in the Opower sample with simple
summary statistics. A nondisclosure agreement prohibits us from naming utilities but
we present the geographic location. Please note that some utilities implement multiple
treatment assignment waves (between one and six). For our research question, we focus
on households from which initial occupants move out after receiving treatment for at
least one month in both treatment and control (“Movers”). The last column provides
the percentage of households that are movers in each utility, e.g. for utility one about
21 percent of households move during the sample period. All results presented in this
paper are based on the movers subsample only.
Online Appendix Table 3: Movers Summary Statistics by Wave-of-Treatment
Movers Pre-Treatment Use Movers Pre-Treatment Use
Wave Number Observations T C First Letter Wave Number Observations T C First Letter
1ı 30,395 1,291,026 864.363 833.725 Aug 2010 22 3,948 81,246 1,066.304 1,076.468 Jul 2012
2 23,070 978,824 1,688.004 1,694.489 Aug 2010 23 1,406 29,112 1,014.776 1,011.297 Jul 2012
3 15,822 656,702 1,182.726 1,163.252 Aug 2010 24 66 1,495 1,790.643 1,724.128 May 2011
4 3,097 87,222 2,141.371 2,123.092 Nov 2011 25 4,244 139,754 744.238 736.733 Apr 2011
5 14,463 616,760 1,084.527 1,073.237 Jul 2010 26 5,085 127,322 520.897 538.172 Feb 2012
6 12,423 411,274 1,162.318 1,179.342 May 2011 27 5,049 184,099 638.862 661.12 Mar 2011
7 13,361 366,668 807.008 809.596 Nov 2011 28 6,309 177,671 978.627 977.99 Oct 2011
8 8,239 286,772 390.083 388.592 Apr 2011 29 4,489 107,770 1,068.279 1,091.592 Feb 2012
9 12,933 699,228 1,236.463 1,271.17 Jul 2009 30 1,938 41,389 847.694 844.301 May 2012
10 800 32,865 1,126.435 1,150.096 Sep 2010 31 5,812 188,273 819.573 828.201 Jun 2011
11 19,697 657,358 1,634.975 1,635.109 May 2011 32ù 311 4,928 621.94 . Nov 2012
12 2,314 59,800 1,080.175 1,086.286 Jan 2012 33 6,702 207,878 1,700.615 1,687.892 Jun 2011
13 6,266 124,023 525.36 528.389 Jul 2012 34 52 740 2,730.257 2,653.666 Jan 2013
14 2,684 52,237 1,576.21 1,546.465 Jul 2012 35 1,091 22,362 1,894.862 1,881.965 Jul 2012
15 8,724 287,265 852.642 859.739 May 2011 36 18,319 1,206,545 923.236 914.195 Oct 2008
16 2,431 55,822 787.757 752.441 Feb 2012 37 12 141 798.864 395.571 Jun 2011
17 3,079 67,365 787.383 800.248 Apr 2012 38 3,783 77,302 1,411.025 1,427.986 Jul 2012
18 5,464 119,209 579.811 588.76 Apr 2012 39 10,821 541,080 837.02 847.447 Dec 2009
19 2,837 83,622 793.282 780.959 Jul 2011 40 1,129 31,823 1,163.58 1,138.052 Nov 2011
20 13,046 484,373 787.648 775.622 Jan 2011 41 2,448 59,810 611.772 605.47 Mar 2012
21ı 5,536 113,633 1,131.824 1,158.822 Jul 2012
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for movers in every wave-of-treatment (RCT) of our sample. Stars (ı) denote
waves that fail a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of the distribution of pre-experiment average usage across treatment
and control at the 5 percent level. Exclusion of waves at the 10 percent level would also include waves 22, 23, and 40; results
do not change qualitatively if this smaller sample is used instead. Additionally, wave 32 (denoted by ù) does not feature
any control movers. We consequently exclude waves 1, 21, and 32 from all main specifications. The “First Letter” column
indicates the date on which the first treatment letter was generated; households enter the sample approximately one year
prior to that. T denotes pre-experiment average monthly usage of households assigned to the treatment group (Home Energy
Report) while C stands for control homes (no correspondence). Multiple waves can belong to the same utility (between one
and six).
Online Appendix Table 4: Summary Statistics of Pooled Movers Sample
Treatment Control Total
Pre-Treatment Use 1,090.703 1,073.156 1,084.505
(620.013) (589.549) (609.483)
Post-Treatment & Pre-Move Use (H) 945.846 941.816 944.418
(636.551) (612.991) (628.307)
Post-Move Use (M) 884.492 873.899 880.75
(701.722) (674.904) (692.385)
Months in Sample 35.509 39.456 36.904
(11.506) (13.193) (12.275)
Premises 163,877 89,505 253,383
Observations 5,819,193 3,531,552 9,350,745
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for the pooled sample of movers in all 38
waves. Average monthly usage is reported for the Pre-Treatment, Treatment and Pre-
Move, and Post-Move time periods. T denotes households assigned to the Treatment
group (Home Energy Report) while C stands for Control. The last column presents the
overall average for the sample.
Online Appendix Table 5: Persistence of Treatment E ects after Move with Di erent
Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
—ˆT 6.03*** 5.95*** 6.52*** 6.50***
(1.82) (1.85) (2.03) (2.05)
—ˆH -41.58*** -43.77*** -52.20*** -53.71***
(1.57) (1.59) (1.73) (1.72)
”ˆtrt -23.69*** -23.45*** -25.02*** -24.98***
(1.86) (1.89) (2.06) (2.05)
—ˆM -131.33*** -134.63*** -145.69*** -148.30***
(2.60) (2.64) (2.68) (2.73)
”ˆmove -10.62*** -10.48*** -11.03*** -11.35***
(2.59) (2.62) (2.60) (2.64)
R2 0.223 0.223 0.216 0.216
N 11,149,461 10,906,948 9,491,121 9,350,745
Notes: Dependent variable is monthly energy usage (kWh). The unit of observation is
household-month. All models include wave-of-treatment (RCT) and month-of-sample
fixed e ects. Coe cients superscripted by T, M, and H denote the Pre-Treatment,
Treatment and Pre-Move, and Post-Move time period, respectively. We estimate the
model for four samples: (1) all observations of households initially flagged as movers for
balanced waves, (2) exclusion of households that were wrongfully flagged as movers due
to changes to the account holder (e.g. marriage or divorce), (3) additional exclusion of
households whose move-out date was updated with a later data pull and who moved
after our last observation for the given customer ID, and (4) additional exclusion of
households with updated move-out date that moved before the first treatment letter was
received. Robust standard errors are clustered at the property level for all specifications.
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.
Online Appendix Table 6: Development of Persistence Post-Move
(1) (2)
12-36 Months 15-33 Months
—ˆT 6.33* 7.70*
(3.45) (4.06)
—ˆH 10.08*** 31.57***
(2.67) (3.11)
”ˆtrt -27.09*** -28.39***
(2.21) (2.51)
—ˆM -127.14*** -95.92***
(5.11) (6.06)
—ˆM · Time 10.65*** 13.68***
(0.37) (0.46)
”ˆmove -18.48*** -20.44***
(4.90) (5.97)
”ˆmove · Time 0.89* 0.46
(0.45) (0.57)
R2 0.203 0.202
N 4,069,425 2,909,426
Notes: Dependent variable is monthly energy usage (kWh). The unit of observation is
household-month. All models include wave-of-treatment (RCT) and month-of-sample
fixed e ects. Coe cients superscripted by T, M, and H denote the Pre-Treatment,
Treatment and Pre-Move, and Post-Move time period, respectively. Time denotes the
time in months since move-out of the original household. Interactions with this time
indicator provide a measure of decay. (1) utilizes all households that were exposed to
treatment between 12 and 36 months before move, (2) those who were exposed between
15 and 33 months. Robust standard errors are clustered at the property level for all
specifications. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level.
Online Appendix Table 7: Heterogeneity in Persistence with a Meta-Analysis Approach and various Exclusion Rules
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5 Rule 6
Underlying Model: Month-of-Year FEs
“ˆ 0.3383*** 0.3517*** 0.3547*** 0.3425*** 0.3562*** 0.2918***
(0.0425) (0.0417) (0.0438) (0.0418) (0.0434) (0.0525)
N 693 691 677 700 679 414
Underlying Model: Month-of-Sample FEs
“ˆ 0.3409*** 0.3544*** 0.3576*** 0.3292*** 0.3591*** 0.2940***
(0.0426) (0.0418) (0.0439) (0.0428) (0.0435) (0.0527)
N 693 691 677 700 679 416
Notes: The table presents estimates of “ based on (8). Robust standard errors are clustered at the wave level for all
specifications. Model 1 utilizes a first stage regression with month-of-year fixed e ects. Model 2 uses month-of-sample fixed
e ects. We estimate “ via weighted least squares according to the inverse variance of ”ˆmovejc /”ˆtrtjc . Exclusion rules are: Rule 1:
Exclude wave-cohorts with fewer than ten movers; Rule 2: Exclude wave-cohorts with 16 or fewer movers; Rule 3: Exclude
first to fifth percentile of wave-cohorts in terms of number of movers; Rule 4: Exclude wave-cohorts with less than 100
observations; Rule 5: Exclude first to fifth percentile of wave-cohorts in terms of number of observations; Rule 6: Rule 1 and
exclude all wave-cohorts with positive ”ˆtrt, i.e. no reduction in response to the social comparison messaging. *** denotes
significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
Online Appendix Table 8: Linear Trend of Persistence using a Meta-Analysis Approach
(1)
“ˆprsttotal 0.2442***
(0.0720)
Cohort 0.0108**
(0.0046)
R2 0.014
N 654
Notes: Coe cients in the table represent the average proportion of initial treatment
e ects (i.e., during the treatment and pre-move time period) that persist in the Post-
Move time period, “. For example, a coe cient of 0.3 means that 30% of the initial
treatment persist after move. Cohort denotes the length of exposure to treatment pre-
move. Inclusion of this variable is aking to a simple time trend in length of exposure. We
excludes wave-cohorts with less than 10 unique households. We estimate “ via weighted
least squares according to the inverse variance of ”ˆmovejc /”ˆtrtjc . Robust standard errors are
clustered at the wave level for all specifications.
Online Appendix Table 9: Sorting of Households based on Home Vacancies and Envi-
ronmental Sentiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vacancy Env. Index Env. Index Green Party Green Party
Rate (Annual) (Lifetime) (District) (County)
—ˆT 7.83** 6.33* 6.87** 16.42*** 6.74***
(3.47) (3.35) (3.37) (4.77) (2.07)
Sorting Variable -0.45* -0.47*** -0.44*** 9.96*** 0.04
(0.27) (0.05) (0.05) (1.59) (0.06)
—ˆT · Sorting -0.18 0.00 -0.01 -4.53** -0.06
(0.31) (0.05) (0.05) (1.99) (0.07)
—ˆH -40.29*** -44.85*** -44.81*** -44.49*** -52.48***
(2.89) (3.28) (3.25) (3.74) (1.75)
—ˆH · Sorting -1.51*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -4.27*** -0.28***
(0.27) (0.06) (0.06) (1.54) (0.07)
”ˆtrt -27.86*** -34.51*** -35.63*** -33.36*** -25.68***
(3.46) (3.97) (3.94) (4.89) (2.08)
”ˆtrt · Sorting 0.39 0.20*** 0.23*** 3.86* 0.16**
(0.33) (0.07) (0.07) (2.05) (0.08)
—ˆM -138.29*** -167.22*** -169.14*** -145.22*** -147.90***
(4.38) (4.20) (4.27) (5.31) (2.76)
—ˆM · Sorting -1.19*** 0.43*** 0.47*** -1.39 -0.10
(0.40) (0.06) (0.06) (2.13) (0.09)
”ˆmove -21.50*** -11.68** -13.21*** -16.51*** -11.88***
(4.78) (4.69) (4.83) (6.21) (2.68)
”move· Sorting 1.16** 0.03 0.07 2.32 0.13
(0.47) (0.08) (0.08) (2.59) (0.10)
R2 0.216 0.217 0.217 0.216 0.216
N 9,247,833 8,916,489 8,921,649 9,350,745 9,350,642
Notes: Dependent variable is monthly energy usage (kWh). The unit of observation is
household-month. All models include wave-of-treatment (RCT) and month-of-sample
fixed e ects. Coe cients superscripted by T, M, and H denote the Pre-Treatment,
Treatment and Pre-move, and Post-Move time period, respectively. We use five di er-
ent sorting variables: (1) Vacancy Rate, i.e. the percent of empty homes in a given
month and ZIP code from 0 to 100, (2) Average Annual Environmental Index for Con-
gressional Representatives for each ZIP-year in the sample from 0 to 100, (3) Lifetime
Environmental Index for every representative in all years of the sample, (4) Proportion
of households donating to any Green Party committee between 2008 and 2015 in each
Congressional District, and (5) Proportion of donors in each county. Sample sizes di er
because data for some ZIP codes, counties or districts are missing. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the property level for all specifications. *** denotes significance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
